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ABSTRACT
Cognitive psychologists have devoted considerable attention to the complex skills described
as perspective-taking, understanding false belief, and deception. Much of the available
research on these phenomena has been driven by a conceptual approach referred to as
‘Theory of Mind’. The current paper reviews the Theory of Mind account of perspective-
taking, false belief and deception in terms of the development of increasingly complex
levels of understanding the informational states of the self and others. In contrast, these
phenomena have attracted little interest traditionally from behavioral psychologists, and
the current paper presents conceptual and empirical evidence that this is changing.
Specifically, an alternative approach to these skills from a functional behavioral framework
is presented in the context of Relational Frame Theory, a modern behavioral account of
human language and cognition. The paper describes the relational frame approach to
perspective-taking, false belief and deception, and presents several recent studies that
have investigated this approach. The results of the studies indicate the potential utility of
this approach and also show considerable overlap with the results of Theory of Mind
research.
Key Words: Perspective-taking, false belief, deception, theory of mind, RFT, behavioral
aproximations.
RESUMEN
Los psicólogos cognitivos han dedicado una atención considerable a las habilidades com-
plejas como la toma de perspectiva, la comprensión de las falsas creencias y el engaño.
Gran parte de la investigación en estas áreas se ha desarrollado bajo la aproximación
conceptual conocida como “Teoría de la Mente”. Este trabajo revisa las explicaciones de
la toma de perspectiva, las falsas creencias y el engaño basadas en la Teoría de la Mente,
en términos del desarrollo de niveles cada vez más complejos de comprensión de los
estados informacionales de uno mismo y de los otros. Por otra parte, tradicionalmente
estos fenómenos han despertado poco interés para los psicólogos conductuales, y el pre-
sente trabajo presenta evidencias de que esto está cambiando. Concretamente, se una
aproximación alternativa a estas habilidades complejas desde un punto de vista funcional-
conductual, desarrollada en el contexto de la Teoría de los Marcos Relacionales, una
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Much of the mainstream research into perspective-taking and the related phenomena
of false belief understanding and deception has focused on Theory of Mind (ToM) as
a means of understanding these phenomena, particularly as they are found to be absent
in autistic populations (see Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen, 2000). Recent
behavioral research has shown an interest in such phenomena under the rubric of
Relational Frame Theory (RFT), a modern behavioral approach to language and cognition
(see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). According to RFT, it is the relational
frames of "I-YOU", "HERE-THERE", "NOW”-THEN", and logical NOT that are cen-
tral to the development of these phenomena. The RFT-based research approach has
been to abstract these relational properties from the concepts and techniques employed
by ToM research and to target them directly for intervention. The current paper presents
a review of cognitive perspective-taking skills followed by a relational frame account
of these phenomena and the empirical evidence in support of the RFT approach. The
paper compares the ToM and RFT approaches and suggests that the latter approach may
provide a useful functional analytic account of phenomena previously beyond the remit
of the behavioral tradition.
Complex cognitive skills such as perspective-taking, understanding false belief,
and deception have attracted considerable attention from mainstream psychologists,
particularly those with an interest in Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD), in which these
skills are believed to be deficient (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Research in these areas has
been dominated by cognitive psychologists, whose work is commonly referred to as
ToM (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000). The concept of ToM
refers, at least in part, to the ability of an individual to understand the relationship
between beliefs and behavior, and thus to know, for example, that beliefs can be false
as well as true (Premack &Woodruff, 1978). According to ToM researchers, one of the
most important sets of cognitive skills that individuals require in order to demonstrate
a fully-developed ToM involves knowledge of the informational states of the self and
others. In the language of ToM, these component skills consist of five levels of
understanding that range from simple visual perspective-taking to acting on the basis
of false belief (Howlin, Baron-Cohen & Hadwin, 1999). Only when all five levels of
ability have been established, would ToM researchers suggest that an individual has
competent ToM repertoires with regard to understanding information. Additional repertoires
reciente propuesta conductual que aborda el estudio del lenguaje humano y la cognición.
El artículo describe esta aproximación a la toma de perspectiva, las falsas creencias y el
engaño, a la vez que presenta diversas investigaciones recientes sobre estos temas, lleva-
das a cabo bajo este marco conceptual. Los resultados obtenidos apuntan a la potencial
utilidad de esta aproximación, y muestran una similitud considerable con los resultados
de investigaciones llevadas a cabo en el contexto de la Teoría de la Mente.
Palabras clave: toma de perspectiva, falsas creencias, engaño, teoría de la mente, RFT,
aproximaciones conductuales.
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concerning the understanding of emotional (as opposed to informational) states of the
self and others would, of course, also have to be established. Only with both sets of
repertoires in place, would an individual be deemed to possess a ToM. The current
article will include a modern behavioral account of the five levels of development that
cognitive researchers have suggested are involved in the understanding of informational
states.
THEORY OF MIND
According to Howlin et al. (1999), there are five levels in the development of
an understanding of another’s mind. Level 1 involves the concept of simple visual
perspective-taking, and, once established, assumes that an individual can understand
that different people can see different things. This skill is typically assessed or established
by presenting a scenario along the following lines. A card with a different picture on
each side (e.g., a dog on one side and a cat on the other) is placed between the child
and the experimenter so that each person can see only one side of the card. The child
is then asked to identify what the experimenter sees. This question assesses a simple
form of visual perspective-taking in which the child is asked to adopt the perspective
of another with regard to the visual environment.
During the complex visual perspective-taking characteristic of ToM Level 2,
individuals are expected to understand that different people may see the same things
differently. In a typical trial, the experimenter and the child are seated opposite one
another, with a picture positioned face up on the table between them. Given this physical
arrangement, the participant, for example, will see the picture the right way up, whereas
the experimenter will see the picture upside down. In this task the child is asked to
describe what s/he can see and what the experimenter can see. The ability to respond
to these questions correctly is said to involve complex perspective-taking skills because
both individuals are actually viewing the same item, yet each has a different perspective
on it.
At Level 3 of understanding informational states, individuals are expected to
understand the principle that ‘seeing leads to knowing’. In a typical scenario, a child
is presented with an empty box, and is asked to close his/her eyes while the experimenter
places an unknown object inside the box. The child is then asked to guess what is inside
the box, and in order to respond correctly, the child should indicate that s/he cannot
know what is inside the box because s/he did not see what was put in there. In a
subsequent part of the trial, the child is then shown inside the box, and is asked “How
do you know what is inside the box?” A correct answer involves the child stating that
s/he can now know what is inside the box because s/he has seen inside. In order to
determine the child’s ability to adopt the perspective of another with regard to this task,
a similar scenario is reenacted with a doll, and the child is asked to adopt the perspective
of the doll with regard to the same events.
According to ToM, Level 4 in the development of informational states involves
the ability to predict actions on the basis of true belief. A typical scenario used to test
this level of understanding is as follows. A child is presented with two play scenes. In
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one scene, a doll is placed beside a toy car, and the child is told that the doll was placed
there earlier that morning. In the second scene, an identical doll is similarly placed
beside a toy plane, and the child is told that this arrangement took place later in the day.
The child is then instructed as follows: “This morning, you saw the doll near the car
but you did not see the doll near the plane. Where do you think the doll is?” In order
to respond correctly, the child should indicate that the doll is near the car. If the child
is then asked: “Why do you think the doll is near the car?” s/he should indicate that
this is where the doll had been seen before. If the child is then asked: “Where would
you go to find the doll?” a correct response would indicate that s/he would look near
the car. If the child is then finally asked “Why will you go to the car?” a correct
response would involve indicating that this is where the doll had been seen previously.
From a ToM perspective, responding correctly to these questions indicates the knowledge
that a person can only know what has been seen, and will act on this basis (i.e., true
belief).
Level 5 of ToM consists of predicting actions on the basis of a false (rather than
true) belief. Specifically, understanding false belief involves knowing that a person’s
mental perspective has a causal impact on his/her actions, even when that perspective
runs counter to reality, and cannot be derived from it (Harman, 1978; Woodruff &
Premack, 1979). A typical false belief scenario may be described as follows. A child is
presented with a sweet box and asked: “What do you think is inside the sweet box?”
Having not seen inside the box, the child will likely suggest that it contains sweets.
However, unbeknownst to the child, the box contains pencils and not sweets. At this
point in the trial, the box is opened and the child is allowed to see the pencils inside.
The child and is then asked, “Before we opened the sweet box, what did you think was
inside?” A correct response involves the child stating that s/he previously thought there
were sweets inside. If then asked “What was really inside?”, a correct response should
now involve stating that there are pencils inside. According to ToM, responding correctly
to these questions indicates the understanding that a person can act on the basis of
previous beliefs that are false, as well as on current beliefs that are true. A similar
scenario is then presented from the perspective of another (e.g., a doll), and the same
questions are posed in order to determine the child’s ability to respond to these tasks
in accordance with an alternative perspective.
Another widely used task for assessing an individual’s understanding of false
belief is the Unexpected Transfer Test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In this task, a protagonist
places an object in a particular location (e.g., location A) and then leaves. In the
absence of the protagonist, the object is unexpectedly transferred from location A to
location B, and thus, upon return, the protagonist mistakenly believes that the object is
still in location A. In order to assess false belief abilities, a child may be asked to
identify where the protagonist thinks the object is. Perner, Leekam & Wimmer (1987)
found that three-year-old children almost universally failed this task by suggesting that
the protagonist will look for the object in its actual location (i.e., location B). Alternatively,
children aged four years and older correctly determined that the protagonist believed
the object to be in the location in which it was first placed (i.e., location A). According
to Perner et al. (1987), younger children fail the Unexpected Transfer Test, and thus fail
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to demonstrate an understanding of false belief, because they do not yet understand the
representational capacity of the human mind.
An understanding of false belief is believed to develop in its most complex form
into the skills of deception (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). As suggested by the five levels
of understanding described above, the development of an understanding of false belief
and deception would appear to require the presence of both perspective-taking (Levels
1 to 3) and understanding true belief (Level 4) as prerequisite skills (Baron-Cohen et
al., 2000). According to ToM, deception can be conceptualized as a complex type of
false belief understanding because it involves knowing that beliefs can be false and that
they can be manipulated. In the language of ToM, however, competent deception skills
also require motivation with regard to obtaining the pay-off that is likely to result from
making someone else believe something to be the case when it is not (Baron-Cohen,
et al., 2000; Sodian, Taylor, Harris & Perner, 1991).
One of the most widely used tools for assessing deception skills in children is
the Maxi Task, which consists of an extended version of the Unexpected Transfer Test
(Premack, 1990). The first part of the task is similar to the scenario described above
for false belief, and involves a story about a character (Maxi), who puts chocolate into
a cupboard (e.g., the red cupboard). In his absence, Maxi’s mother relocates the cho-
colate from the red cupboard to the blue cupboard. As in the previous task, the child’s
understanding of false belief is determined by asking the question “Where will Maxi
look for the chocolate when he returns”? In the second part of the task, Maxi’s brother
is introduced. In the unfolding scenario, his brother wants to have the chocolate and
asks Maxi to tell him where it is. In an attempt to deceive his brother and to avoid him
getting the chocolate, Maxi (who still believes the chocolate is in the red cupboard)
tells his brother that the chocolate is in the blue cupboard (where in fact it is). In order
to determine the child’s ability to understand this combination of false belief and
deception, s/he is asked: “Where will Maxi tell his brother the chocolate is?” According
to ToM, a correct answer to this question depends on the child’s interpretation of
Maxi’s intention to deceive his brother by giving him information that he knows to be
false.
The literature on ToM conceptualizes the skills of perspective-taking, understanding
false belief, and deception in terms of levels of understanding of informational states
with regard to the self and others. These skills require a progression in levels of
cognitive complexity from simple visual perspective-taking to understanding false belief,
and the latter skill in Level 5 forms the basis of the most complex understanding of
informational states, deception. According to ToM, this progression most likely occurs
in a sequential manner with earlier skills (e.g., in perspective-taking) acting as prerequisites
for the development of the more complex skills (e.g., deception). In the remaining parts
of the current paper, we present an alternative interpretation of these ToM skills that
has emerged from the field of behavioral psychology, and in particular from the modern
behavioral account of language and cognition known as RFT. In describing the RFT
account of these abilities, we will also summarize evidence from numerous empirical
studies that have investigated the validity of the RFT concepts in this regard, and other
studies that have attempted to remediate deficits in these areas using interventions
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suggested by RFT.  In the final section of the paper, possible areas of overlap between
the ToM and RFT approaches to perspective-taking, understanding false belief, and
deception will be discussed.
RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY AND PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
The relational frames that appear to be most critical for the development of
perspective-taking skills are the deictic frames that specify a relation in terms of the
perspective of the speaker (these are sometimes referred to as the perspective-taking
frames). Unlike other relational frames, these do not appear to have formal or nonarbitrary
counterparts (e.g., ‘same as’ arbitrary relations may be based on a learning history
involving formal similarity).  The three deictic frames that appear to be involved in
perspective-taking are the frames of I and YOU, HERE and THERE, and NOW and
THEN (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes & Cullinan, 2001; McHugh, Barnes-Holmes &
Barnes-Holmes, 2004). Deictic relations are believed to emerge in part through a history
of responding to questions such as “What was I doing there?” and “What are you doing
now?” Although the form of these questions may vary little across contexts, the physical
environment referred to in the questions can vary greatly from instance to instance.
Thus the relationship between the individual and other events (i.e., one’s perspective)
serves as the constant variable upon which the frames are based (i.e., I is the same
perspective now as it was yesterday). That is, the relational properties of I versus YOU,
HERE versus THERE, and NOW versus THEN remain constant, irrespective of the
changing physical context. According to RFT, these constant relational properties are
abstracted through many exemplars of learning to talk about one’s perspective in relation
to the perspective of others (Hayes, 1984). For example, I is always from this perspective
here, but not from the perspective of another person there. Consider a similar scenario
to that presented for ToM Level 2, in which two children are sitting opposite one
another and observing a picture placed on the table in front of them. In this arrangement,
the child on one side of the table will see the picture the right way up, whereas the child
on the other side will see the picture upside down. Although both children in this
example are observing the same picture, the perspective of the child on one side is
different from the perspective of the child on the other side. In other words, when the
child on one side speaks of seeing the picture from “here”, it is not the same place as
when the child on the other side speaks of “here”.
Although many instances of perspective-taking involve the spoken words “I,
“you”, “here”, “there”, “now”, and “then” (e.g., “you were there then and I am here
now”), RFT argues that the perspective-taking properties may be present even when
these actual words are absent. Specifically, relevant phrases often include, or substitute,
words that participate in frames of coordination with particular individuals, places, and
times (e.g., “It is one o’ clock and I am at home [HERE and NOW], but Molly [YOU]
is still at playschool” [THERE and NOW]). These substituted words serve the same
contextual functions that would otherwise be provided by the actual words (e.g., “I”
and “you”) themselves. For example, “Molly” or “her” may be functionally equivalent
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Table 1. Examples of the Perspective-taking Trial-types used by McHugh et al. (2004).
I-YOU Frame
Simple I-YOU task 
“I have a red brick and you have a green brick. Which brick do you have? Which brick do I have?” 
Reversed I-YOU task 
“I have a red brick and you have a green brick. If I was you and you were me. Which brick would I have? Which 
brick would you have?”
HERE-THERE Frame 
Simple I-YOU within Simple HERE-THERE task
“I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. Where are you sitting? Where am I 
sitting?” 
 
Reversed I-YOU within Simple HERE-THERE task
“I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was you and you were me: where 
would I be sitting? Where would you be sitting?”
Simple I-YOU within Reversed HERE-THERE task
“I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If here was there and there was here: 
where would you be sitting? Where would I be sitting?”
Double Reversed I-YOU/HERE-THERE task
“I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was you and you were me, and if 
here was there and there was here: where would I be sitting? Where would you be sitting?”
NOW-THEN Frame
Simple I within Simple NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. What am I doing now? What was I doing then?” 
Simple YOU within Simple NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading. What are you doing now? What were you doing 
then?” 
Simple I within Reversed NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. If now was then and then was now: what would I be doing 
then? What would I be doing now?”
Simple YOU within Reversed NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading. If now was then and then was now: what would 
you be doing then? What would you be doing now?”
Simple I within Simple HERE-THERE within Simple NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. Where was I sitting then? 
Where am I sitting now?” 
Simple YOU within Simple HERE-THERE within Simple NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black chair. Where were you 
sitting then? Where are you sitting now?”
Simple I within Reversed HERE-THERE within Simple NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. If here was there and there 
was here: where would I be sitting then? Where would I be sitting now?”
Simple YOU within Reversed HERE-THERE within Simple NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black chair. If here was there 
and there was here: where would you be sitting then? Where would you be sitting now?”
Simple I within Simple HERE-THERE within Reversed NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. If now was then and then 
was now: where would I be sitting then? Where would I be sitting now?”
Simple YOU within Simple HERE-THERE within Reversed NOW-THEN task
“Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black chair. If now was then 
and then was now: where would you be sitting then? Where would you be sitting now?”
Simple I within Double HERE-THERE/NOW-THEN Reversed task
“Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. If here was there and there 
was here and if now was then and then was now: where would I be sitting now? Where would I be sitting then?” 
Simple YOU within Double HERE-THERE/NOW-THEN Reversed task
“Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black chair. If here was there 
and there was here and if now was then and then was now. Where would you be sitting now? Where would you be 
sitting then?” 
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to “YOU”, and “at playschool” may be functionally equivalent to “there”. What is
important, from an RFT point of view, is the generalized relational activity and not the
actual words themselves.
To date, several studies have investigated the RFT approach to perspective-
taking. One of the earliest studies in this area was conducted by McHugh, et al. (2004),
and employed a revised version of a test protocol developed previously by Barnes-
Holmes (2001). Both studies involved a protocol that was designed to target explicitly
the three perspective-taking frames of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-THEN. In
addition, the McHugh et al. protocol investigated three levels of relational complexity
across the perspective-taking tasks, referred to as: simple relations, reversed relations,
and double reversed relations. This latter protocol contained trial-types that involved
various combinations of the perspective-taking frames and levels of relational complexity,
and these are outlined in Table 1.
Consider the following perspective-taking trial-type referred to by McHugh et
al. as a ‘Simple I-YOU trial,’ described as such because the I-YOU frame is targeted
explicitly and the level of relational complexity is the lowest possible (i.e., simple).
During this trial, participants were presented with the following question: “If I
(Experimenter) have a red brick and YOU (Participant) have a blue brick: Which brick
do I have? Which brick do YOU have?” According to RFT, responding correctly to this
trial (i.e., “You/Experimenter have a red brick and I/Participant have a blue brick”)
requires that participants respond in accordance with the I-YOU frame, under the contextual
control of the if-then frame. In other words, the if-then frame determines the functions
(i.e., of the red and blue bricks) that become attached to I and YOU in that context.
McHugh and colleagues referred to this task as ‘simple’ in terms of relational complexity
because neither of the I/YOU relations was reversed.
The McHugh protocol included similar trials (referred to as simple HERE-THERE
trials) that involved the same level of relational complexity but that targeted the HERE-
THERE frame (rather than I-YOU). In a simple HERE-THERE trial, the participants
were instructed, for example, as follows: “I am sitting here on the blue chair, and you
are sitting there on the black chair. Where are you sitting? Where am I sitting?” Although
in this trial the HERE-THERE relations are targeted explicitly, it is also evident from
the example that the task contains I-YOU relations. A correct response on this trial,
therefore, requires that participants respond in accordance with both I-YOU and HERE-
THERE frames, under the contextual control of if-then.  In the third type of simple
relational task presented by McHugh et al., NOW-THEN relations were targeted explicitly.
Consider the following example: “Yesterday I was watching television, today I am
reading. What was I doing then? What am I doing now?” All NOW-THEN trials differed
from the other trials in that they did not involve responding to both I and YOU
simultaneously (see Table 1). Consider again the current example (referred to as a
Simple I within Simple NOW-THEN trial) in which the participant was asked only to
determine what I (the Experimenter) am/was doing. In other words, the participant was
required to take only the perspective of another and the perspective of the self was not
presented. In the development of the original perspective-taking protocol, Barnes-Holmes
(2001) argued that this modification was necessary because if both perspectives are
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requested during a NOW-THEN trial, some of the relations to be derived become
unspecified. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical trial: “Yesterday I was
watching television, today you are reading”. As a result of this information, you will
be able to determine the I-THEN and the YOU-NOW relations, but the I-NOW and
YOU-THEN relations cannot be specified without additional information (e.g., stating
that I was watching television yesterday provides no information about what you were
doing at that time). In order to address this issue, the perspective-taking protocols by
Barnes-Holmes and by McHugh et al. contained trials that targeted NOW and THEN
relations from the perspective of I (Simple I within Simple NOW-THEN trials), and a
similar number of trials that targeted NOW-THEN relations from the perspective of you
(Simple YOU within Simple NOW-THEN trials).
According to RFT, a more complex level of relational responding is required to
derive deictic relations when they are reversed (i.e., these tasks require a higher level
of relational complexity than deriving simple relations). The McHugh protocol contained
reversals of the relations from all three perspective-taking frames (see Table 1). Consider
the following reversed I-YOU trial: “If I have a red brick and you have a green brick,
and if I was you and you were me: Which brick would you have? Which brick would
I have?” In the language of RFT, a correct response to this trial involves a transformation
of functions in accordance with a deictic relation between I and YOU (required by the
statement “if I was you and you were me”). More specifically, the mutually entailed
relation between I and YOU transfers “red brick” from I to YOU and “green brick”
from YOU to I. The protocol also contained trials involving similar reversals of the
HERE-THERE and NOW-THEN relations (see Table 1). Once again, during NOW-
THEN reversed trials only one perspective was tested in order to avoid the derivation
of unspecified relations.
 According to McHugh et al., the third and highest level of relational complexity
involves ‘double reversed relations,’ in which two types of deictic relations are reversed
simultaneously. In the development of the perspective-taking protocol, Barnes-Holmes
(2001) had designed two types of double reversal tasks. During I-YOU/HERE-THERE
double reversals, the relations contained within the deictic frames of I-YOU and HERE-
THERE are reversed simultaneously. Consider the following trial: “I am sitting here on
the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was you and you were
me, and if here was there and there was here: Where would you be sitting? Where
would I be sitting?” (see Table 1). In this trial, the I-YOU reversal followed by the
HERE-THERE reversal involves two sets of mutually entailed relations between I and
YOU and between HERE and THERE, thus reversing the initially reversed relations.
In simple terms, the participant deriving these relations ends up in the seat in which s/
he originally started.
HERE-THERE/NOW-THEN double reversal trials followed the same format,
but were based on the simultaneous reversal of HERE-THERE and NOW-THEN relations
(rather than I-YOU and HERE-THERE relations). Consider the following example:
“Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black
chair. If here was there and there was here, and if now was then and then was now:
Where would I be sitting now? Where would I be sitting then?” Once again, the
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participant deriving these relations ends up in the chair in which s/he started, because
the two sets of mutually entailed relations between HERE and THERE and between
NOW and THEN reverse the initially reversed relations
In a related study, McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, O’Hora & Barnes-Holmes (in press)
exposed thirty-two undergraduate participants (aged 18-30 years old) to the tasks described
above across four experimental conditions. These conditions were employed in order to
investigate different ways of presenting the trials and different numbers of exposures
to the various trial-types. During Conditions 1-3, the researchers employed the full
perspective-taking protocol (referred to as the “extended protocol”) developed by Barnes-
Holmes (2001), which contained 265 trials. Only the format in which the extended
protocol was presented differentiated these three conditions. Specifically, in Condition
1, the experimenter read all tasks aloud, and a range of visual aids were used during
the presentation of each trial (similar items had been employed previously by Barnes-
Holmes in an attempt to reduce the memory requirements of the experimental tasks
when presented to young children.)  In Condition 2, the trials were presented in written
form to participants, and no visual aids were employed. This comparison was designed
to determine whether the visual aids facilitated the relational performances of participants
in the previous condition. In Condition 3, the experimenter once again read out the
tasks, but during this condition no visual aids were employed. This condition was used
to determine whether any differences recorded between Conditions 1 and 2 resulted
from the participants’ reading of the tasks or from the visual aids. During Condition 4,
the researchers presented participants with an abbreviated version of the original protocol
that consisted of only 66 (rather than 265) trials. Two key features differentiated this
short protocol from the original extended protocol. First, although the short protocol
contained all of the same trial-types, there were fewer exposures to each. Second, in the
short protocol the trials were randomly presented, whereas in the original protocol the
trial-types were presented in a fixed sequence of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, and NOW-
THEN relations, respectively. Both of these modifications had arisen from the fact that
the extended protocol had been designed originally by Barnes-Holmes (2001) for training
with young children, whereas McHugh et al. (in press) used both protocols for test
purposes only with adult participants. Thus, in order to eliminate possible fatigue and
order effects that resulted from use of the extended protocol in Conditions 1-3, McHugh
et al. employed the short protocol in Condition 4. In this condition the experimenter
read the instructions and no visual aids were employed.
 McHugh et al. (in press) analyzed their findings in terms of the type of protocol
employed across experimental conditions (i.e., they analyzed the data from the exten-
ded protocol used in Conditions 1-3 separately from the data from the short protocol
employed in Condition 4). The findings from this study first revealed no significant
differences among Conditions 1-3, suggesting that neither the person reading the tasks
nor the visual aids had an effect on participants’ performances. Consistent significant
differences, however, were recorded for both relation type and relational complexity
within these conditions. With regard to relation type, participants’ performed significantly
better on I-YOU relations compared to HERE-THERE relations, but no significant
differences were recorded among the other relations. With regard to relational complexity,
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participants in Conditions 1-3 performed significantly better on simple relations compared
to both reversed and double reversed relations; and on reversed relations compared to
double reversed relations.
The results of Condition 4 revealed significantly better performances on I-YOU
relations when compared to both HERE-THERE and NOW-THEN relations. Because
the latter finding was not recorded in the former conditions, it suggests that the lack
of differences observed therein might well have resulted from an order effect (i.e., the
extensive exposure to HERE-THERE trials facilitated correct responding on the NOW-
THEN trials). With regard to relational complexity in Condition 4, participants produced
significantly better performances on simple relations when compared to both reversed
and double reversed relations (but no significant difference was recorded between reversed
and double reversed relations as in previous conditions). The researchers suggested that
one possible reason for this latter difference across the protocols was that most of the
double reversal trials in the extended protocol were presented at the end of the protocol,
whereas this was not the case with the short protocol. The significant differences,
therefore, in the former protocol may have resulted from fatigue effects that produced
increases in the error rates on the double reversed relational performances, but not on
the reversal trials presented before that point. In summary, therefore, the findings from
McHugh et al. suggested that adult participants performed differently on different types
of deictic relations. Specifically, the participants performed better on I-YOU relations
than on HERE-THERE or NOW-THEN relations. These participants also performed
differently on the different levels of relational complexity, and produced better
performances on simple relations than on reversed or double reversed relations. Overall,
these significant differences in performances for relation type and relational complexity
suggested that even in adult populations, perspective-taking appears to consist of
functionally distinct relational components.
In the subsequent study by the same authors (McHugh et al., 2004), the shortened
perspective-taking protocol was used in an attempt to conduct a developmental profile
of relational perspective-taking skills in individuals from different age groups. The
same 66-trial protocol used in the previous study (Condition 4) was presented twice to
forty participants from five age bands spanning from early childhood to adulthood.
These age bands were as follows: 3-5 years (early childhood); 6-8 years (middle childhood);
9-11 years (late childhood); 12-14 years (adolescence); and 18–30 years (adulthood).
During this study, all experimental trials were read aloud by the experimenter and no
visual aids were employed.
These researchers analyzed their data from this study in terms of age, relation
type, and relational complexity. The mean percentage of errors of participants in each
of the five age groups on the three levels of relational complexity is presented in Figure
1. The figure indicates a clear developmental trend in the abilities of participants from
the different age groups to perform the perspective-taking tasks using the relational
protocol. In other words, accuracy on the perspective-taking tasks increased as a function
of age. Specifically, the youngest children (aged 3-5 years) produced significantly higher
levels of errors overall than all of the older participants (ranging from 6-30 years), and
the middle and late childhood groups produced significantly higher levels of errors than
172
© Intern. Jour. Psych. Psychol. Ther.
 McHUGH, BARNES-HOLMES AND BARNES-HOLMES
both the adolescents and adults.
With regard to relation type, the findings from this study revealed significant
differences between NOW-THEN and HERE-THERE simple relations; between HERE-
THERE and I-YOU reversed relations, and between NOW-THEN and I-YOU reversed
relations. Similar to the results of the previous study, these data indicated that responding
in accordance with the NOW-THEN frame produced the greatest difficulty for the
participants. With regard to relational complexity, the data from the latter study showed
significant differences between simple and reversed trials for all three relation types
(i.e., significantly stronger performances were recorded on I-YOU simple relations than
on I-YOU reversed trials; on HERE-THERE simple than reversed relations; and on
NOW-THEN simple than reversed relations). This pattern of significant differences
indicates that levels of accuracy appeared to decrease as a function of relational complexity.
Broadly speaking, participants in the four oldest age groups produced their lowest
levels of errors on I-YOU relations and their highest levels of errors on NOW-THEN
relations. Furthermore, participants performed better on simple relations overall than on
reversed relations. As well as being consistent with the findings from the previous
study involving the same protocol, the authors also noted the consistency of these data
with the mainstream cognitive literature, which has reported that performances on
simple ToM tasks generally develop across the ages of four and five years old, and are
usually well established by age six (Taylor, 1988).
In two related studies, McHugh et al. (2004) investigated whether the low rates
of accuracy recorded with the youngest group of children was simply a function of the
length of the statements contained within some of the tasks (Study 2), and whether the
Figure 1. Mean percentage of errors recorded for the five age groups of participants
in the perspective-taking protocol employed by McHugh et al. (2004).
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low rates of errors recorded with the adult participants was possibly a function of
experimenter cueing (Study 3). In Study 2, the researchers controlled for statement
length by the inclusion of reversed and double reversed foil trials presented to new
participants from the two youngest age groups in Study 1 (no foils of simple relations
were included). These trials contained statements of the same number of words as the
original trials but did not involve complex relational responding. An example of a foil
reversal trial is as follows: “I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there
on the black chair. If here was here and there was there: Where would I be sitting?
Where would you be sitting?” This foil trial differed from the original HERE-THERE
reversals because no transformation of functions between mutually entailed relations is
required (i.e., the participant and experimenter remain in the same positions in which
they began).
When compared to Study 1, participants from both age groups in Study 2 produced
significantly lower levels of errors on both the reversed and double reversed relations
(including foils). This finding lent firm support to the conclusion that the performances
of the youngest children in Study 1 were due, at least in part, to the requirement that
a deictic relation be derived in order to produce the correct response to reversed and
double reversed trials.
In Study 3, the researchers attempted to control for possible experimenter cueing
with the use of an automated version of the protocol presented to another group of adult
participants. Across the two studies, no significant differences were recorded between
the performances of the adult participants exposed to the table-top and automated
procedures. This finding indicated that it was unlikely that participants exposed to the
table-top procedure in Study 1 were influenced by experimenter cueing.
In summary, therefore, the findings from these studies indicated that the relational
repertoires required for perspective-taking appear to follow a distinct developmental
trend that is generally consistent with trends observed for ToM perspective-taking skills,
and that these relational repertoires may be comprised of functional relational components.
The findings from these studies overall point to the possible utility of describing and
investigating perspective-taking using concepts generated by RFT. One of the most
significant outcomes of this work has been the development of a precise and reliable
protocol for studying perspective-taking that can be administered to individuals from
a range of age bands. However, in all of the studies described thus far, the perspective-
taking protocol has only been used as a test procedure. In other words, it is yet to be
evaluated as a possible tool for remediating perspective-taking deficits, such as those
characteristically observed in autistic populations. If it could be demonstrated that the
existing protocol may facilitate the establishment of these relational skills ab initio,
then the utility of the RFT approach to perspective-taking would be greatly enhanced.
Two preliminary RFT training studies have been conducted using the perspective-
taking protocol to remediate deficits in relational perspective-taking in several normally
developing young children (Barnes-Holmes, 2001; McHugh, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2003a). In the first study by Barnes-Holmes, two children were exposed to the
extended perspective-taking protocol with corrective feedback presented after each trial.
In order to complete all levels of the protocol, one seven-year-old female required
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explicit training on the reversed and double reversed relations. A three-and-a-half year
old male was exposed only to I-YOU and HERE-THERE trials, and required extensive
training across exemplars, also on the reversed and double reversed relations (Barnes-
Holmes, 2001) in order to complete these two levels of the protocol. These data are also
consistent with the ToM literature, and suggest that these perspective-taking abilities
are rarely present in children under four years of age and that even in older children,
the relational repertoires may not be fully established or flexible.
In the most recent perspective-taking study by McHugh et al. (2003a), the shortened
version of the protocol was used to assess and establish relational perspective-taking in
a four-year old male. Although the findings from this study indicated that on initial
assessment the child displayed a repertoire of simple I-YOU and simple HERE-THERE
relations, no relational skills with regard to NOW-THEN appeared to be present. Explicit
training on reversed and double reversed I-YOU and HERE-THERE relations was
provided and the child proceeded through this training with relative ease. Much greater
difficulty, however, was encountered during attempts to establish NOW-THEN responding,
even with simple tasks. Extensive training on all levels of NOW-THEN responding was
necessary in order for this child to complete the perspective-taking protocol.
Thus far, several studies have investigated the development and establishment of
perspective-taking skills using concepts and methodologies generated by RFT. This
work has identified specific relational components that constitute perspective-taking as
a set of overarching relational skills, and has suggested ways in which these components
overlap and influence one other. Furthermore, the results of the work conducted to date
have suggested significant overlap between this approach to perspective-taking and
ToM. As well as the development of a reliable protocol for assessing perspective-
taking, even in young children, several studies have highlighted the possible use of the
protocol as an effective tool for facilitating or establishing the perspective-taking skills
if they are found to be deficient or absent.
As a result of the work on perspective-taking, McHugh, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-
Holmes (2003b) began to investigate the relational skills that might be involved in
understanding false belief as a more complex form of perspective-taking. In pursuit of
this aim, the researchers attempted to develop a similar protocol that might target
explicitly the relational frames involved in false belief, and which might also be used
eventually to remediate deficits in this regard. It is to this issue that we now turn.
RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY AND FALSE BELIEF
Because the RFT research on perspective-taking appeared to be consistent with
the ToM Levels 1-3 of understanding informational states in the self and others, it
seemed feasible that the RFT analysis could be extended to an understanding of true
and false belief at Levels 4 and 5 of ToM. Furthermore, perhaps the existing protocol
for assessing perspective-taking could be modified to investigate true and false belief.
In an attempt to investigate the understanding of true and false belief, McHugh
et al. (2003b) developed a short protocol of relational tasks modeled on their perspective-
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taking task. This task emphasized the deictic relational frames and drew on the ToM
procedure known as the Deceptive Container Task. The new protocol consisted of six
trial-types that differed from each other in terms of the relational frame or frames being
targeted. The six trial-types were referred to by McHugh et al. as: HERE trials, THERE
trials, NOT HERE trials, NOT THERE trials, BEFORE NOW trials, and AFTER NOW
trials. Examples of these trial-types are presented in Table 2.
In this protocol, three trial-types were employed to assess responding to true
belief (consistent with ToM Level 4): these were HERE trials, THERE trials, and
AFTER NOW trials. In the first two trial-types, responding in accordance with the
frame of HERE-THERE was targeted explicitly, whereas the third trial-type targeted
NOW-THEN responding. Consider the following THERE trial: “If you put the pencils
in the sweet box and I am there: what would I think is in the sweet box? What would
you think is in the sweet box?” This trial-type emphasizes the THERE aspect of responding
Table 2. Examples of the Six Trial-types in the False Belief Protocol Employed
by McHugh et al. (2003b)
HERE Trial-type
“If you put the pencil in the sweet box and I am here.
What would I think is in the sweet box?
What would you think is in the sweet box?”
NOT HERE Trial-type
“If you put the pencil in the sweet box and I am not here.
What would you think is in the sweet box?
What would I think is in the sweet box?”
THERE Trial-type
“If you put the pencil in the sweet box and I was there.
What would I think is in the sweet box?
What would you think is in the sweet box?”
NOT THERE Trial-type
“If I put the pencil in the sweet box and you were not there.
What would you think is in the sweet box?
What would I think is in the sweet box?”
BEFORE NOW Trial-type
“You open the sweet box and there is a pencil inside now.
Now what do you think is in the sweet box?
Before now what do you think is in the sweet box?”
AFTER NOW Trial-type
“I open the sweet box and there is a pencil inside now.
Now what do I think is in the sweet box?
After now what do I think is in the sweet box?”
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on the basis of the HERE-THERE frame (because the action in question has been
conducted in a location specified as THERE). The protocol also contained HERE trials
that were identical to THERE trials, except that the perspective of HERE was emphasized
(e.g., If you put the pencils in the sweet box and I was here: what would I think is in
the sweet box? What would you think is in the sweet box?”). The third trial-type
designed to assess responding on the basis of true belief was referred to as an AFTER
NOW trial. Consider the following example “You open the sweet box and there are
pencils inside now. Now, what do you think is in the sweet box? After now, what would
you think is in the sweet box?” This task assessed true belief because the correct
response required participants to indicate that they can act on the basis of what they
have seen as true.  These three trial-types were incorporated into the protocol in an
attempt to assess responding on the basis of true belief, and as such were used to permit
comparisons with false belief.
From an RFT perspective, responding in accordance with logical not may be
important in understanding false belief. In line with this thinking, the three true belief
trial-types described above were modified in order to permit them to function as false
belief trials, and were referred to as NOT HERE, NOT THERE, and BEFORE NOW
trials. The former two false belief trials were almost identical to the true belief HERE
and THERE trials, respectively, except that they involved the addition of logical not.
Consider a NOT HERE trial: “If I put the pencils in the sweet box and you were not
here: what would I think is in the sweet box? What would you think is in the sweet
box?” The correct response in this case involves indicating that I (Experimenter) will
know what is inside, but you (Participant) will not know, because you were not located
here where the action in question occurred. The NOT THERE trials were almost identical
to the NOT HERE trials, except that once again THERE was emphasized instead of
HERE. Unlike the other false belief trials, BEFORE NOW trials did not assess false
belief by emphasizing logical not. Instead, false belief was implied in the temporal
order of the events stated in the trial. Consider the following example: “You open the
sweet box and there are pencils inside now. Now, what do you think is in the sweet
box? Before now, what did you think was in the sweet box?” This task assessed false
belief because the correct answer required participants to determine that BEFORE
NOW they could only act on the basis of a false belief (i.e., that there were sweets in
the sweet box).
The true and false belief protocol developed by McHugh et al. contained ten
exposures to each of the six trial-types by incorporating five hypothetical stimulus sets.
For example, during one stimulus set a sweet box contained pencils instead of sweets,
and during another set, a cookie jar contained a teddy instead of cookies. The use of
multiple stimulus sets permitted adequate exposures to each trial-type that were then
used to generate a developmental profile of true and false belief abilities, similar to that
which was conducted with the development of perspective-taking skills. Once again,
five groups of participants aged within five age bands from early childhood to adulthood
were compared. The mean number of errors on the six trial-types for participants in
each of the five age bands is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2 indicates a clear developmental trend in the abilities of participants
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aged from early childhood to adulthood to respond on the basis of true and false belief
as assessed on the relational protocol.  Participants in the youngest age group (3-5
years) produced the highest number of errors while those in the oldest age group (18-
30 years) produced the lowest number of errors. Furthermore, the number of errors
produced by participants between these two age groups increased as a function of age.
Statistical analyses revealed significant differences in the level of errors overall among
all age groups except between adolescence and late childhood. Unlike the results of the
previous RFT study on perspective-taking, no significant differences were recorded
among any of the six trial-types, suggesting possible functional overlap among responding
to true and false belief on this relational protocol.
As a natural extension of the previous work on perspective-taking, McHugh et
al (2003b) attempted to use RFT concepts in order to account for the development of
understanding true and false belief. The results from this work were remarkably similar
to those obtained with perspective-taking, and showed a strong developmental trend in
the emergence of these skills. Although much more work needs to be done, the results
of this first investigation suggested significant functional overlap between understanding
true/false belief and perspective-taking that appeared to be largely consistent with the
ToM literature in this area. It was once again the utility of the relational frame approach
to perspective-taking and false belief that led to a subsequent attempt to expand these
ideas in an attempt to understand and investigate the development of deception, and it
is to this issue that we now turn.
Figure 2. Mean number of errors recorded for the five age groups of participants in
the true and false belief protocol employed by McHugh et al. (2003b).
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RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY AND DECEPTION
As an extension of the RFT research program on perspective-taking and responding
to true/false belief, researchers in this area have also begun an empirical analysis of
deception. In line with ToM, RFT research in this area has approached deception as a
more complex type of false belief responding. Based on this reasoning, McHugh, Barnes-
Holmes & Barnes-Holmes (2003c), modified their relational true/false belief protocol
to include tasks that appear to target the relational skills that may underpin deception,
as traditionally defined.
In this study, forty participants aged between 3 and 30 years old were involved,
and were grouped as before according to five age categories in order to generate a
possible developmental profile of deception skills. The deception protocol consisted of
six trial-types, referred to here as: First-order Positive trials; First-order Negative trials;
Control Positive trials; Control Negative trials; Second-order Positive trials; and Second-
order Negative trials, and these are presented in Table 3.
All of the trial-types in the deception protocol involved the automated presentation
of scenarios that were similar to that created in the Maxi Test, as traditionally employed
by ToM researchers. Specifically, all trial-types involved one picture of an object to be
hidden (e.g., a teddy), and two pictures of places in which to hide the object (e.g., a
toy box and a refrigerator). During each trial, a hypothetical situation was then created
Table 3. Examples of the Six Trial-types in the Deception Protocol Employed by
McHugh et al. (2003c)
First-order Positive Tasks
“If I have a teddy and I want you to find it, where should I put the 
teddy?”
 First-order Negative Tasks
“If you have a teddy and you don’t want me to find it, where should you 
hide the teddy?”
 Second-order Positive Tasks
“If you have a teddy and if you know that I know you’re trying to hide it 
from me, where should you hide the teddy?”
 Second-order Negative Tasks
“If I have a teddy and if I know that you don’t know I’m trying to hide it 
from you, where should I hide the teddy?”
 Control Positive Tasks
“You and I are playing a game, if you have a teddy and you want me to 
find it, where should you put the teddy?”
 Control Negative Tasks
“You and I are playing a game, if I have a teddy and I don’t want you to 
find it, where should I hide the teddy?”
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with regard to the three pictures. Consider the following First-order Positive trial, in
which the pictures of a teddy, a toy box and a refrigerator were presented on the
computer screen, and the participant was then instructed as follows: “If I have a teddy
and I want you to find it, where should I put the teddy?” Participants were then required
to drag the picture of the object, (i.e., the teddy) into one of the target locations (i.e.,
into either the refrigerator or the toy box). This trial-type was referred to as a First-
order Positive trial because it involved the protagonist (i.e., the experimenter) positively
wanting the participant to find the object, and the trial did not involve any form of
deception. A correct response on this trial would involve the participant indicating that
I (Experimenter) should put the teddy in the toy box because this is where you (participant)
will be able to find it (because one would normally look for a teddy in a toy box rather
than a refrigerator). First-order Negative trials were almost identical to this, except that
the scenario presented to the participant indicated that I (experimenter) do not wish you
(participant) to find the object. A correct response on this trial-type would involve the
participant indicating that I (experimenter) should hide the teddy in the location in
which you (participant) are not likely to find it (e.g., I should hide a teddy in a refrigerator
rather than a toy box).
The Control Positive and Control Negative trials were employed by McHugh et
al. to act as control trials for the shorter statements involved in the First-order Positive
and Negative trials when compared with the Second-order Positive and Negative trials,
respectively. The only difference between the first-order and control trials was that the
latter involved the words “You and I are playing a game” at the beginning of the
statement. Consider the following example of a Control Negative trial: “You and I are
playing a game, if you have a teddy and you do not want me to find it, where should
you hide the teddy?”
The remaining two trials-types in the deception protocol were referred to as
Second-order Positive and Second-order Negative trials, both of which were based on
the first-order trials, but which were more complex in terms of the level of relational
activity required to respond to them correctly. Consider the example of a Second-order
Positive trial in which the participant was instructed as follows: “If I have a teddy and
if I know that you know I’m trying to hide it from you, where should I hide the teddy”?
A correct response to this trial would involve the participant indicating that I (Experimenter)
should hide the teddy in the toy box because you (participant) will not look in the toy
box (where you normally would expect to find a teddy) because you think I am trying
to hide the teddy from you.
Now consider an example of a Second-order Negative trial, in which the participant
may be instructed as follows: “If you have a teddy and if you know that I don’t know
you’re trying to hide it from me, where should you hide the teddy?” A correct response
to this trial would involve the participant indicating that you (participant) should hide
the teddy in the refrigerator because I (experimenter) will not look there, (i.e., you
would not normally expect to find a teddy in the refrigerator) because I do not know
that you are trying to hide the teddy from me.
The mean number of errors on the six trial-types produced by participants from
the five age groups in the deception study is presented in Figure 3. The figure indicates
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a clear developmental trend in terms of the number of errors overall produced by
participants across the five age groups. That is, participants in the youngest age group
(3-5 years) produced the largest number of errors while participants in the oldest age
group (18-30 years) produced the least number of errors. As expected, the number of
errors produced by participants in the different age categories also increased as a function
of age. Statistical analyses revealed significant effects for age and trial-type, and a
significant interaction effect between these two variables. With regard to age, there
were significant differences among all age groups except between adolescence and late
childhood. Significant differences were also recorded among trial-types, with younger
participants (3-5 and 6-8 year olds) performing significantly worse on the Second-order
than on the First-order trials, and older participants (9–30 year olds) performing equally
well across all tasks. Significant differences were also recorded between the Control
trials and the Second-order trials, but not between the First-order trials and the Control
trials. This finding suggests that the weaker performances on the Second-order trials
probably resulted from the greater level of relational complexity than simply from the
length of the statement presented during the task. In summary, the results from the RFT
deception study indicated a clear developmental trend in the performances of participants
aged from childhood to adulthood on the deception protocol.
In a related study currently underway by the same researchers, the deception
protocol has also been used in an attempt to train these deception skills in young
children when the relational repertoires are found to be absent (McHugh et al. 2003c).
Figure 3. Mean number of errors recorded for the five age groups of participants in
the deception protocol employed by McHugh, et al., (2003c).
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In the training conducted to date, a six-year old normally-developing boy has been
trained successfully to respond to all of the tasks contained within the protocol, and the
child has subsequently performed accurately on generalization tests involving the same
trial-types but different stimulus sets. This preliminary work once again highlights the
possible utility of the RFT-based deception protocol as both a testing and training tool
for identifying and, where necessary, remediating deception skills.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The cognitive abilities involved in ToM, understanding false belief, and deception
are considered by most mainstream cognitive and developmental psychologists to be
critical for competent adult functioning. Theory of Mind researchers, in particular, have
devoted considerable research attention to these areas, although there remains little
clear evidence to validate the concepts and methodologies they have employed. For
example, the ToM literature gives no clear distinction between false belief and deception.
Furthermore, little or no empirical evidence attests to the efficacy of ToM interventions
that have been used to establish perspective-taking, false belief understanding or deception,
when these skills are found to be absent.
Prior to the emergence of RFT as a modern behavioral and functional account
of human language and cognition, behavioral psychologists had very little to say about
complex cognitive skills such as perspective-taking, false belief, and deception. However,
with RFT’s explicit interest in cognition as a viable subject matter, and with the inherent
developmental nature of RFT as a theory of language and cognition, it has now provided
behavioral researchers with a set of conceptual and methodological tools to address
these issues from a behavioral perspective. The empirical work reported in the current
article on perspective-taking, false belief, and deception indicates that a behavioral
interpretation and investigation of these abilities is both possible and informative.
Furthermore, the considerable overlap between the RFT data and the ToM findings on
these topics may be an important area for future study and integration between these
two disparate traditions. The evidence from the training studies also suggests that there
may be considerable practical benefits to be gained from a relational frame analysis of
these cognitive abilities. Although much more work needs to be done from both con-
ceptual and applied perspectives, the evidence reported in the current paper suggests
that such endeavors may well be worthwhile.
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